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Adjusting the Bright-Line Age of Accountability
within the Criminal Justice System: Raising the
Age of Majority to Age 21 based on the Conclusions
of Scientific Studies Regarding Neurological




The criminal justice system determines a criminal actor's liability
based primarily on the age of the actor at the time of the offense,
adhering to a rule instituted by arbitrary designation of adulthood
at the age of eighteen. Solely, this line determines the degree of treat-
ment a criminal defendant will receive within the system, with more
punitive measures being reserved for adult offenders and greater re-
habilitative efforts made for juvenile offenders. Despite the many
concessions made within the criminal system, this rule is concrete
and rarely questioned.
However, studies of neurological development show that the part
of the brain directly related to the ability to understand choices and
consequences, playing a direct role in culpability, does not fully de-
velop until the mid-twenties, three to five years after a person is
deemed capable of making mature decisions. This leads to a dis-
crepancy within the criminal system, with youthful adults being
forced within the adult system to face potentially negative influences
and life-long consequences, though, mentally, they are not any more
blameworthy than youthful offenders in the decisions they make.
This article argues that the age of majority within the criminal
system should be raised to the age of twenty-one, at a minimum,
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based on strong scientific evidence that indicates there is no signifi-
cant difference in the brain functioning of young adults between late
adolescence and early adulthood. This adjustment is necessary for
a developing society concerned with utilizing the receptiveness of
young adults to deter further criminal behaviors, reduce recidivism,
prevent further victimization, and create more productive members
of society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the criminal justice system is divided into two parts:
the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system.'
The degree of culpability attached to a criminal defendant is gener-
ally determined by the age of majority-age eighteen in most states.
1. See J. Hirby, Difference Between Juvenile and Adult Justice Systems, THE LAW
DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/difference-between-juvenile-and-adult-jus-
tice-systems/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (providing a description of the differences between
the two systems).
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On which side of this bright-line a criminal defendant falls dramat-
ically affects the degree of accountability attributed to the defend-
ant, how he or she is treated within the justice system, and the po-
tential damaging effects of a criminal record. This Article proposes
an adjustment to the current age of majority to encompass young
adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one based on scien-
tific evidence that indicates that a person's decision-making capa-
bilities do not dramatically, or even marginally, change at the age
of eighteen. This conclusion is principally due to the wealth of neu-
rological evidence that shows little substantive difference in the
brain development of a seventeen-year-old versus an eighteen- or
even twenty-year-old.2 Moreover, neurological studies show that
the area of the brain that allows adults to make responsible, ra-
tional decisions is not fully developed until early adulthood, usually
around the twenty-two- to twenty-five-year-old age range.3 There-
fore, the justice system should view criminal culpability for young
adult offenders the same as it does for juvenile offenders, focusing
more on rehabilitative efforts with an emphasis on creating respon-
sible adults, rather than punitive measures and retribution. Rais-
ing the age of majority as it relates to criminal matters to encom-
pass all adults with limited decision-making capabilities is the most
effective way to accomplish this goal.
II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The criminal justice system is a seldom-shifting monolith; with
three main functions divided between the police, the courts, and
corrections,4 and with each local unit making up a piece of a whole
within the United States. Each system attempts to maintain con-
sistency with the others, while also acting separately. Within this
system, the age of majority is the rule least likely to fluctuate over
time.5 What is the purpose of this system of power? The founders
2. See generally Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the
Emerging Adult Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 27 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 766
(2006). Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of how the brain continues to develop into adult-
hood is the onset of certain mental health disorders that do not generally occur until early
adulthood, usually between ages eighteen and twenty-one. Id. at 775.
3. See generally Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of Cognitive Processes from Late Child-
hood to Adulthood, 75 CHILD DEV. 1357, 1362-70 (2004).
4. See Off. of Just. Programs, The Justice System, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/justsys.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (providing a thorough de-
scription of the three functions, and many sub-functions, of the criminal system).
5. See Jeffrey F. Gent, Annotation, Statutory Change of Age of Majority as Affecting Pre-
existing Status or Rights, 75 A.L.R. 3d 228 (1977). At common law, the age of majority was
set at twenty-one. See id. at § 2(a). Over time, states have legislatively lowered the age, but
remain generally consistent in keeping the age between seventeen and eighteen. See id.
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of the United States of America declared that each of us, as citizens,
possess a right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness[;]"6 un-
alienable rights within the government's duty to protect.7 Thus, the
creation of a criminal system designed to shield us from the poor
decisions made by each other and by ourselves. The system cannot
be static to be effective, but instead must be dynamic, adjusting to
fit the needs of society; working to balance the needs of the victims,
through punishment and retribution, with the needs of the criminal
defendant, through rehabilitation and recovery.8 This is a difficult
balance to maintain as societal attitudes fluctuate throughout gen-
erations.9 Punishment is easy; our laws allow us to imprison a cit-
izen for the duration of his or her life, providing all of the essentials
to sustain within the four walls of the prison system.10 The more
difficult route is rehabilitation; specifically in determining when it
is worth the time and money to attempt to remold a destructive
member of society into a productive one."
A. The Beginnings of Criminal Justice in America
Early criminal justice in America was a construct of the English
common law, blended with religious-based principles, and adapted
to suit the needs of colonial America.12 Punishment was a means
for stamping out the evils of society, a carry-over of the long-time
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
7. Id. ("That to secure the rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.").
8. See Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, 34 MONITOR ONPSYCHOL. 46, 46 (2003).
See also Peter D. Hart Research Assoc., Inc., Changing Public Attitudes toward the Criminal
Justice System: Summary of Findings, OPEN SOC'Y INST. (2002) for a current analysis of the
variations in societal attitudes toward crime and punishment.
9. Peter D. Hart, Research Assoc., Inc., supra note 8, at 1.
10. See Jean Chung & Ashley Nellis, Life Goes On: The Historic Rise in Life Sentences in
America, THE SENTENCING PROJECT: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY FOR REFORM (2013) for a thor-
ough analysis of the rise in long-term prison sentences in the United States. The stated
mission of the Federal Bureau of Prisons is: "[T]o protect society by confining offenders in the
controlled environments of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane,
cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that provide work and other self-improvement
opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens." BOP: Agency Pillars,
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/agency-pillars.jsp (last visited
Apr. 8, 2016).
11. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189 (2013) for an
analysis of the current push for "the rehabilitation of rehabilitation" in the prison system,
using "evidence-based programming and predictive tools to create a rehabilitative model that
'works."' Id. at 189.
12. See James A. Cox, Bilboes, Brands, and Branks: Colonial Crimes and Punishments,
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring03/branks.cfm
(last visited May 9, 2017).
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"eye for an eye" principle found in ancient legal and biblical texts.13
Justice was generally swift and public; often painful or deadly, and
involving branding, nailing, beating, and hanging.14 As society
evolved, so did the methods for dealing with criminal behaviors,
with imprisonment quickly becoming the preferred approach, rap-
idly creating the "revolving door of punishment" that exists today.1 5
Initially, there was no real deviation in how offenders were
treated based on age and maturity; children and adults received
identical punishments for identical crimes.16 However, during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as children began to be viewed
as "persons at a unique stage of human development instead of
smaller versions of adults with equal cognitive and moral capaci-
ties[,]" 17 society began to recognize a need for treating child offend-
ers differently than adult offenders.18
This early evolution of the juvenile justice system was the first
recognized move toward rehabilitation within the system, focusing
more on the "why" of the offender's poor decisions than on the
"what" of the particular criminal behaviors.19 As early as 1825, ad-
ministrators and policymakers took up the cry of reform begun by
the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, creating fa-
cilities exclusively for juveniles in most major cities.20 Leading up
to the mid-twentieth century, the juvenile system flourished, with
13. This principle is attributed to a number of legal and spiritual texts, the first being
the Code of Hammurabi, an ancient set of laws dating back to the Mesopotamian civilization
and said to be the foundation of all criminal punishment principles. Hammurabi's Code: An
Eye for an Eye, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/civ/4c.asp (last visited May 9,
2017). The oft referred to passage states:
If a man has destroyed the eye of a man of the gentleman class, they shall destroy
his eye. . . . If he has destroyed the eye of a commoner. . . he shall pay one mina
of silver. If he has destroyed the eye of a gentleman's slave. . . he shall pay half
the slave's price.
Id. The same principle is found in the law of the Old Testament, a subsequent ext of laws,
in the book of Leviticus: "And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour; as he hath done, so
shall it be done to him; Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a
blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again." Leviticus 24:19-20 (King James).
14. See Cox, supra note 12.
15. Rachel O'Connor, The United States Prison System: A Comparative Analysis 2 (Mar.
19, 2014) (unpublished Graduate Thesis and Dissertation, University of South Florida) (on
file with University of South Florida Scholar Commons, http://scholarcom-
mons.usf.edu/etd/5086).
16. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Chapter 2: Jurisdictional and
Program Self-Assessment: Historical Overview of the Juvenile Justice System,




19. See Bulletin: Juvenile Justice: A Century of Change, NAT'L REPORT SERIES, JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Dec. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9912_2/juv1.html.
20. Id. at 1.
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the primary mission being the desire to help children in need, and
which led to the formation of substantive differences between the
juvenile and adult criminal systems.2 1
B. The Rise of the "Justice Model"
Preceded by a sharp rise in the national crime rate in the 1960s,
the mid-1970s led to an overhaul of the criminal system, juvenile
and adult alike.2 2 Following public outcry for harsher sanctions
driven by the fear of potential victimization, the focus turned from
the seemingly ineffective rehabilitative model to a system of pun-
ishment and retribution.23 This new system, commonly known as
the "justice model," limited the discretion of correctional officials in
adjusting the necessary punishment for individual offenders and
instead instituted determinate sentencing.24 This push was initi-
ated by some social scientists and analysts who warned of a coming
of juvenile "superpredators" they predicted would become a "new
breed" of cold-blooded murderers.25 Though it is not evident that
such superpredatory juveniles ever materialized, the move toward
a more punitive juvenile system did, with the threat of transfer to
the adult system being the ultimatum in the tug-of-war between
juvenile and adult sanctions.26 A series of decisions based on a per-
ceived need for a harsher juvenile method led to a formalization of
the juvenile system, meant to parallel the adult criminal system by




24. See James C. Howell et al., Bulletin 5: Young Offenders and an Effective Response in
the Juvenile and Adult Justice Systems: What Happens, What Should Happen, and What We
Need to Know (Study Group on the Transitions between Juvenile Delinquency and Adult
Crime), U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 242935, 1 (2013). Determinate sentencing is "[a] jail or prison
sentence that is definite and not subject to review by a parole board or other agency." Deter-
minate Sentence, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/determinate-sentence-term.html
(last visited May 9, 2017).
25. Id. at 3. "Superpredator" was a term coined by a prevalent political scientist and
professor of the time, John J. Delulio, who often wrote about what he predicted to be a likely
increase in the juvenile crime rate based on a prevalence of moral depravity within society
and juveniles' homes. See John J. Delulio, Jr., Arresting Ideas, POL'Y REV. 74 (1996); John J.
Delulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD 23 (Nov. 27, 1995).
26. See Lisa A. Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1996).
27. Bulletin: Juvenile Justice: A Century of Change, supra note 19, at 3-4.
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III. THE RETURN OF THE REHABILITATIVE MODEL
Over time, the pendulum has slowly moved away from the ex-
treme call for harsh punishment for all, juveniles and adults alike,
founded in a pessimistic "nothing works" mentality concerning the
justice system.28 Policymakers and practitioners have begun to em-
brace evidence-based corrections and professionalism, with a focus
on reducing recidivism and changing behaviors, specifically in
youthful offenders.29 However, opinions still vary concerning how
the criminal justice system can effectively handle juveniles and
young adults with criminal behaviors.30 Though the current domi-
nant policies are agreeable to more rehabilitation-focused methods
for all offenders,31 a strong line continues to separate late adoles-
cence, typically drawn at the age of eighteen,32 and adulthood when
determining a criminal actor's culpability. Although what consti-
tutes proper treatment within the justice system is regularly de-
bated, especially as it relates to juvenile offenders,33 the bright-line
age of accountability that qualifies a juvenile offender is rarely con-
sidered.34 However, studies related to brain development-specifi-
cally cognitive development and the maturing processes of the ju-
venile brain-create a means for calling into question this age of
28. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299,
300 (2013). This idea was pioneered by Robert Martinson, who was best known for his 1974
essay published in The Public Interest that was "widely understood to show that 'nothing
works' in correctional programming to reform offenders." Id. Interestingly, Martinson later
recanted his position after he conducted a subsequent study, which showed rehabilitation
does work in some instances. Id. at 328.
29. See Evidence-Based Practices, NAT'L INST. OF CORR., http://nicic.gov/evi-
dencebasedpractices (last visited May 9, 2017) ("In corrections, Evidence-Based Practice is
the breadth of research and knowledge around processes and tools which can improve cor-
rectional outcomes, such as reduced recidivism. Tools and best practices are provided with
a focus on both decision making and implementation.").
30. See generally Cullen, supra note 28, for an example of the available scholarship re-
lated to the differing professional opinions of how juveniles with criminal behaviors should
be treated within the criminal system.
31. Id. at 307-08.
32. Some states, such as New York, draw the line as young as thirteen years of age for
certain offenses, but other states generally set he standard at sixteen years of age. See N.Y.
INFANCY LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 2015). Some states, like Alabama, raise the bar to the age
of nineteen. See ALA. CODE § 26-1-1 (2015). See also Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Con-
struction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000) for an analysis on the constructs of
adolescents through the use of the legal system.
33. See generally Steven A. Drizin & Thomas F. Geraghty, The Debate over the Future of
Juvenile Courts: Can We Reach Consensus, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1997).
34. Although courts in recent years have addressed the need to prohibit mandatory sen-
tencing and transfer laws for juveniles, see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005),
there has been little to no discussion considering the possibility of changing the legal defini-
tion of an infant or juvenile within the system.
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majority standard, with convincing evidence that indicates the hu-
man brain does not fully develop until early adulthood.35 This casts
doubt on the criminal boundaries used to determine degrees of cul-
pability with youthful offenders.36 To be fair, these studies do not
indicate a teenager or young adult is not capable of possessing log-
ical reasoning abilities, as the evidence illustrates these competen-
cies are more or less fully developed by the age of fifteen.37 How-
ever, they do indicate that the area of the brain affecting impulse
control, emotion regulation, delayed gratification, and the effect of
peer influences continues to develop for several years after the age
of eighteen, well past the legal boundary of adulthood.38
The consensus among neurologists and social scientists, who fo-
cus their studies on brain maturation, is that, due to this delay in
development, young adults, like juveniles, may have a lesser degree
of culpability than older adults, and the criminal justice system
should, therefore, treat them differently.39 One example of this de-
velopmental delay is in how the preventative measures and deter-
rence programs used within our communities geared toward youth
and young adults have been shown to lead to an increased aware-
ness of risky behaviors, but cause no real behavioral changes, and,
in fact, may exacerbate the troublesome behaviors.40 The juvenile
justice system has incorporated these ideas in recent years, taking
baby steps through legislative and judicial actions to reconcile the
lack of decision-making skills in juvenile offenders with the degree
of adjudication, in an attempt to circumvent the juvenile's path to
life-long criminality.41 Administrators within the juvenile system
35. See generally Luna et al., supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. See Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives From Brain
and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55, 55 (2007).
38. Id. at 56.
39. See generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Ad-
olescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003).
40. Steinberg, supra note 37, at 55 ("Efforts to provide adolescents with information
about the risks of substance use, reckless driving, and unprotected sex typically result in
improvements in young people's thinking about these phenomena but seldom change their
actual behavior.").
41. For example, the juvenile justice system has increased the use of risk/needs assess-
ments as an attempt to develop individualized programing for offenders. See Dev. Servs.
Grp., Inc., Risk/Needs Assessments for Youths, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 1, 2 (Jan. 2015), http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Riskand
Needs.pdf.
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have embraced a new mantra, believing that, with appropriate re-
habilitative methods, and "given time to deliberate with guidance
from mature adults, adolescents can make responsible decisions."42
Despite the changes in the juvenile system, there has been little
significant change within the adult criminal system related to
young adult offenders, notwithstanding consensus within the scien-
tific community that the behaviors and decision-making skills of a
young adult-typically those between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five-more closely align with those of juvenile offenders
than of adult offenders.4 3 Studies addressing criminal behaviors of
young adults parallel this understanding, showing the age of sev-
enteen to twenty to be the peak of the poor-decision-making bell
curve, known within the community as the "age-crime curve."44
This effect demonstrates that the prevalence of offending increases
from late childhood, peaking directly on the boundary of the bright-
line age of adulthood (seventeen to nineteen) before beginning to
decline in the early twenties.4 5 Subsequently, a study focusing on
the likelihood of the continuation of criminal behaviors of youth
found that more than fifty percent of juvenile offenders would con-
tinue their criminal behavior during early adulthood (ages twenty
to twenty-five), but that percentage drops dramatically, by two-
thirds, between ages twenty-five and thirty.4 6
This Article aims to accomplish two main objectives: (1) call into
question the continued adherence to the age of majority as it relates
to criminal behaviors, despite the abundance of scientific infor-
mation indicating the need for a shift of this bright-line rule; and
(2) propose changes within the system to reconcile this information
with the public policy reasoning behind appropriate sanctions.
IV. RECONCILING THE NEED FOR PUNISHMENT WITH THE
DESIRE FOR REHABILITATION
The two methods utilized within the criminal justice system, pun-
ishment and rehabilitation, are dynamic, fluctuating over time.
Though rehabilitation is favorable to the public when it is most ef-
fective, rarely does it take precedence over the desire to compensate
42. Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to Culpability and
Rehabilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1469 (2012).
43. See Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington & David Petechuk, Bulletin 1: From Juvenile
Delinquency to Young Adult Offending (Study Group on the Transitions between Juvenile
Delinquency and Adult Crime), U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 242931 (2013).
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 5. The study also indicated that the persistence of criminal behavior changes
depending on the type of offense, with the highest likelihood being for drug offenses. Id.
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the victim, whether through retributive or pecuniary measures.47
Perhaps this is due to a fear of failure in balancing the needs and
desires of the community with the potential, but not guaranteed,
positive result of rehabilitation of the offender, leading to an overa-
bundance of caution in determining the appropriate methodology.
The separation of the juvenile and adult systems was the first real
step taken in finding a comfortable balance.4 8 The intention driving
this separation, based on the understanding that juveniles do not
have the decision-making capabilities of adults, helped manifest a
juvenile system designed to serve the needs of the perpetrators, the-
oretically making them productive, law-abiding adults.4 9 Society is
seemingly more open to rehabilitative methods within the juvenile
system because of the innate understanding that children are not
adults, with some underlying cause driving their poor behaviors,
and therefore they should be treated differently. Naturally, a line
needs to be drawn in order to distinguish between less blameworthy
juveniles and culpable adults, but that line was originally drawn
based on the common law and statutory practices of the state, not
behavioral and neurological science, when determining the age of
majority.
A. The Bright-Line Age of Majority
At common law, courts set the age of majority at twenty-one fol-
lowing court decisions related to parental custody and financial
support.5 0 The age of majority eventually began to change statuto-
rily, intended to coincide with the age most children were no longer
in school, and, thus, able to begin working, start families, join the
military, and vote.5 1 That transition has led to a presumptive age
of majority settling at or around the age of eighteen, a time when
adolescents are usually defined as being at one of two ends of a ma-
turity spectrum-either as an undeveloped child or a mature
adult-"depending upon the desired classification."5 2 Though it
47. See generally Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Be-
tween Rhetoric and Reality in the U.S. Prison System, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1, 33-68 (Mar.
2011).
48. See Drizin & Geraghty, supra note 33, at 1-2.
49. See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1977) (holding that a statutory
distinction between males and females related to the age of majority violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the United States Constitution).
51. See Gent, supra note 5, at 2; see also Sen. Birch Bayh, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. REP. NO. 92-96 (1971).
52. Scott, supra note 32, at 556, 559.
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seems evident based on current neurological science that there is
no significant difference in the neurological development of a person
who falls directly on either side of this bright-line age of eighteen,
both advocates and lawmakers tend to ignore the realities of ado-
lescence "and endorse fictional accounts in which adolescents are
either immature children . . . or mature adults."53 Adjusting the
age of majority is more likely to occur through a decrease in the age
of majority, as occurred with the voting age in the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution,54 because it is a
seemingly more comfortable prospect. It seems that society has
been more willing to accept stricter sanctions for older youth in the
hope of safeguarding the community, even potentially at the ex-
pense of turning a rehabilitative youth into a lifetime criminal of-
fender.
1. Neurological Sciences
The field of neurology provides a wealth of information concern-
ing the decision-making capabilities of juveniles and young adults,
demonstrated through studies focusing on the development of the
brain as it relates to maturity. These studies ultimately conclude
adolescent brain development may be linked to late maturation of
the prefrontal cortex.55 For example, a study conducted out of the
University of Pittsburgh assessed processing speeds, voluntary re-
sponse suppression, and spatial working memory, all of which are
53. Id. at 557. One instance is the juvenile to criminal transfer laws. After the push for
harsher punishments, the laws were changed to allow for juvenile transfer to adult courts,
typically according to the degree of the offense, to ensure the punishment would fit the crime.
See Danziger, supra note 49, at 383-84.
54. See Sen. Birch Bayh, supra note 51. The greatest factor in the push to reduce the
voting age was the discrepancy between the voting age and the draft age during the Vietnam
War. Id. at 6. But, even at this time, the age of eighteen had long been regarded as the
presumed age of majority. As Montana Senator Michael J. Mansfield noted, the age of eight-
een had long been regarded as the age at which young people assume economic and social
responsibilities of adults. Id.
55. Luna et al., supra note 3, at 1368. These studies focus primarily on two processes:
brain maturation, such as synaptic pruning, which is described as "the selective elimination
of unnecessary neuronal connections . .. [that] can speed and enhance the precision of infor-
mation processing[,]" and myelination, which "allows for faster responses and for superior
integration of widely distributed circuitry necessary for the top-down modulation of behav-
ior." Id. at 1358, 1369. Synaptic pruning occurs in order to eliminate unused synaptic con-
nections created through childhood and into adolescence, allowing the brain "to most opti-
mally adjust to the individual's environment." Luna, supra note 42, at 1475. Synaptic prun-
ing and myelination, when viewed as a parallel process, indicate that adolescence is "marked
by refinements across the brain that support integration of information and thereby foster
higher-order cognitive processes." Id. at 1477.
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essential for cognitive control of behavior.5 6 The clinicians con-
cluded that adult level, mature performance typically begins at ap-
proximately age fourteen to nineteen and plateaus between late ad-
olescence and early adulthood, though it is still unknown when ex-
actly it reaches peak maturation.5 7 The same study noted that neu-
roimaging results also indicate that the period of development for
reaching adult levels of performance is characterized by improve-
ments in existing processes via progressively more efficient use of
brain circuitry.5 8 This indicates a correlation between the perfor-
mance levels of the brain circuitry, especially in the prefrontal cor-
tex, with maturity in behavioral control.59 Researchers from Har-
vard Medical School, the National Institute of Mental Health, and
the University of California, Los Angeles School of Medicine, con-
ducted studies and found evidence contrary to that which is com-
monly understood about the maturity of older youth; that the brain
is fully mature by early adolescence.60 These studies focused on the
prefrontal cortex, the "chief executive officer" of advanced cerebral
activities.61 The results indicate that rather than the essential wir-
ing being complete in early childhood, as was the current under-
standing, the brain develops in spurts throughout childhood and
adolescence, meaning the teenage brain is not a "finished product,"
but rather a "work in progress" continuing well into early adult-
hood.62
Laurence Steinberg, a lead researcher of the juvenile brain and
its processes,63 not only recognizes the legitimacy of the synaptic
pruning and myelination results,64 but also attributes the problem
to an enlarged nucleus accumbens, which is the reward circuit of
56. Luna et al., supra note 3, at 1358.
57. Id. at 1366. These results were based on the use of 245 participants ranging from
age eight to age thirty. Id. at 1359.
58. Id. at 1369.
59. Id.
60. Howell et al., supra note 24, at 17. This research was conducted using magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) to measure brain development. Id.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Terrible Teens: What's Wrong with Them?, NEW YORKER (Aug.
31, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-terrible-teens (discussing
Steinberg's work in neurological studies of the adolescent brain). Steinberg is a professor of
psychology at Temple University and the author of Age of Opportunity: Lessons from the New
Science of Adolescence. Department of Psychology: Laurence Steinberg, TEMPLE UNIV., http://
www.cla.temple.edu/psychology/faculty/laurence-steinberg/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
64. See supra text accompanying note 55 for a brief explanation of these processes.
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the brain involved in motivation, reward, motor function, and learn-
ing.65 Steinberg attributes two processes as contributing to reward-
seeking behaviors in youth: (1) the growth of the nucleus accumben,
at its largest during adolescence before shrinking in early adult-
hood; and (2) an increase in dopamine66-the chemical in the brain
that allows a person to seek rewards and take actions to attain
them-levels which also peak in adolescence and do not decrease
until adulthood.67 Moreover, the same peak in dopamine that
makes dangerous behaviors so appealing also increases an adoles-
cent's ability to learn and to rehabilitate, with the peak in the pro-
duction of dopamine meeting exactly with the age of majority.6 8
This indicates that the deficiency in the youthful brain that makes
a child more destructive also makes him or her more amenable to
treatment, and possibly long-term behavioral change, which makes
adolescence and young adulthood the ideal time for rehabilitation.
Explaining why adolescents do so many "stupid things," Stein-
berg emphasizes that the problem behavior does not lie with a lack
of knowledge, finding this idea "ludicrous," but instead that the ef-
fects of pleasure-seeking behavior far outweigh the brain's solidly
present warning signals.69 Steinberg sees evidence of this discrep-
ancy through mortality rates, in a phenomenon called the "accident
hump."70 The accident hump shows that adolescents, who are
healthier mentally and physically than younger children, have a
higher death rate attributed to accidental deaths.71 For example,
the mortality rate of fifteen- to nineteen-year-old Americans is
"nearly twice" that of those between ages five and fourteen.72 Stein-
berg and others seem to recognize this as evidence of the young
mind's consistent inability to make the right decision at the right
time, even when the youth has the knowledge to do so.7 3
65. See generally Yukihiko Shirayama & Shigeyuki Chaki, Neurochemistry of the Nu-
cleus Accumbens and its Relevance to Depression and Antidepressant Action in Rodents, 4
CURRENT NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 277 (2006).
66. "Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that acts on synapses in the frontal cortex and the
ventral striatum, a nucleus in the limbic system of the brain that plays a crucial role in
motivated behavior." Luna, supra note 42, at 1477.
67. Kolbert, supra note 63, at 3-4; see also Luna, supra note 42, at 1477.
68. Luna, supra note 42, at 1477.
69. Kolbert, supra note 63, at 4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. For an extensive analysis on the accident hump, see The Human Mortality Da-
tabase (HMD), which was created "to provide detailed mortality and population data to re-
searchers, students, journalists, policy analysts, and others interested in the history of hu-
man longevity." The Human Mortality Database, MORTALITY, http://www.mortality.org (last
visited Dec. 28, 2015).




Studies in the field of behavioral sciences tend to come to similar
conclusions, consistently showing that adolescents differ from
adults in three important ways: (1) they lack the mature capacity
of self-regulation in emotionally charged contexts; (2) they have a
heightened sensitivity to proximal external influences; and (3) they
show less ability to make judgments and decisions that require fu-
ture orientation.74 As a result, these differences lead to a preva-
lence of risky behaviors, rising by a third until the age of sixteen,
and declining by a half of standard deviation by age twenty-six.75
Moreover, these risky behaviors dramatically increase in the pres-
ence of other peers, with the most substantial increase among teen-
agers, but also a moderate increase among college-age individuals.7 6
Based on this information, it is evident that the cognitive develop-
ment of a juvenile is not complete in late adolescence, or even into
early adulthood. It is a natural conclusion then, based on the ever-
increasing available information, that one does not flip a switch and
turn on mature thinking and behaviors at the age of eighteen, or
even twenty-one. This is not to say that adolescents and young
adults cannot make mature decisions; rather, they "might be ma-
ture enough to make some decisions[,] but not others."7 7
Some studies observing developmental improvements in execu-
tive function, or the ability to generate planned voluntary responses
to stimuli, indicate that basic cognitive abilities are available early
in life, but "sophisticated use" of these abilities continues to improve
through adulthood.7 8 Specifically, the ability to perform complex
tasks continues to develop, become more precise, and control dis-
tractions, like the distraction of encouragement by peers.79 What
makes this information relevant is that intent, as an element of cul-
pability, requires the demonstration of executive control for a will-
ful act, engaging multiple behavioral and cognitive processes.8 0
Can a youth, being incapable of having full executive control over
74. See RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 95, 97 (2012).
75. Id. at 91.
76. See Steinberg, supra note 37, at 57.
77. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform
Public Policy?, 28 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 67, 71 (2012).
78. Luna, supra note 42, at 1474.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1470.
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his or her decision-making capabilities, paired with increased vul-
nerability to sensation-seeking, ever be truly culpable?81 The prev-
alent scientific evidence calls this idea into question.
B. Systematic Adjustments for Youthful Offenders
The United States Supreme Court recognized the differences in
the culpability of youthful and adult offenders as early as the
1980s.8 2 Relying on the prevalence of emerging studies like those
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court began making adjust-
ments to the boundaries in the disposition of juvenile offenders
transferred into the adult system.83 First, the Supreme Court took
the greatest step toward eliminating unconstitutionally harsh sanc-
tions of youthful offenders by holding that an offender who was un-
der the age of eighteen at the time of the criminal act could not re-
ceive a death sentence.84 The Court then quickly extended these
protections to include mandatory life sentences, for violent and non-
violent offenders, holding these sentences to be "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the offense committed, and, thus, a violation of the
Eighth amendment.85 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, a seven-
teen-year-old male committed capital murder and was sentenced to
death.86 The Court, finding the sentence unconstitutional, ration-
alized the ruling by pointing out the Court's previous acknowledge-
ment of the low likelihood that offenders under sixteen engaged in
"the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of execution" made the death penalty ineffective as a
means of deterrence.87 Subsequently, the Court noted that the
81. Id. at 1470-72.
82. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (determining that standards of de-
cency did not permit the execution of an offender who was under the age of sixteen during
the commission of the crime).
83. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). In its discussion of prece-
dent regarding the societal changes in attitudes toward harsh sanctions, such as life impris-
onment, for juveniles, the Court referred to its decision in Roper v. Simmons, and acknowl-
edged these studies by stating: "Our decisions rested not only on common sense-on what
'any parent knows'-but on science and social science as well." Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
84. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). The Supreme Court's reasoning
behind the decision paralleled that of the cognitive behavioral studies: an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, susceptibility to outside influences, and a poorly formed character.
Id. at 569-70.
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (relying on the rationale from
Roper, and determining that the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole
for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding mandatory sentences of life imprisonment for non-homicidal of-
fenses violates the Eighth Amendment).
86. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
87. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-38).
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same rationale applied equally to all juvenile age offenders.88 This
was a clear recognition by the Court that the use of extreme sanc-
tions as deterrence, specifically the threat of the death penalty or
life in prison, does not consistently work with young offenders.89
It is evident through these rulings that the Supreme Court takes
into great consideration the deficiencies of the youthful brain as it
relates to proper decision-making, and more so, that a youthful
mind has a greater potential for rehabilitation and redemption. De-
spite whether or not it was the intention of the Court, these ideas,
as supported by neurological and behavioral studies, indicate a de-
sire to give young offenders every opportunity to redeem them-
selves, en route to becoming productive members of society. On the
surface, this is what the criminal justice system claims to be about.
However, it should be noted that these rulings only apply to the
most extreme sentences and only prohibit mandatory sentencing,
meaning some juveniles can and do spend the majority of their lives
serving sentences for crimes committed as children.90
Despite the judicial changes made to juvenile sentencing, the
same cannot be said for offenders over the age of majority, even as
it relates to juvenile offenses.91 As the Supreme Court first recog-
nized in Atkins v. Virginia, concessions are made for adults who are
classified as "mentally retarded," as the courts appreciate that the
mentally challenged have a lesser degree of culpability based on
their mental disabilities.92 In Atkins, the Court held that commit-
ting a mentally challenged individual to death, even when only
mildly disabled, was a violation of the Eighth Amendment as cruel
88. Id. at 568 ("A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders under [eighteen], and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amend-
ment.").
89. The evidence is somewhat conflicting in this area. Two studies conducted in the
1980s show no deterrent effect, while the bulk of studies conducted from the 1970s through
the 1990s show that criminal sanctions in general have a moderate deterrent effect on juve-
nile crime. However, the bulk of empirical studies show that transfer laws specifically have
little to no effect on juvenile crime rates. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An
Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION 2 (2010).
90. Some states still require judges to sentence individuals, juvenile and adult, without
consideration of any factors relating to age or life circumstances, as well as requiring that all
juveniles charged with homicide be tried in the adult system. See Ashley Nellis, The Lives of
Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 3 (2012).
91. See generally United States v. Coleman, 563 F. App'x. 740 (11th Cir. 2014) (allowing
juvenile adjudications as qualifying convictions for disposition purposes).
92. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
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and unusual punishment.93 As the ruling in Atkins shows, the Su-
preme Court mirrors the progression of public opinion regarding
how certain individuals should be treated, embracing a "consistency
of the direction of change."94 Interestingly, the Atkins rationale was
also used in Roper, where the court made a correlation between the
culpability of the mentally retarded and juvenile offenders as simi-
larly not on par with the average adult.95
As the Atkins Court indicated, mental disability does not elimi-
nate the need for accountability; however, greater consideration
should be taken because "by definition, [the mentally disabled] have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to under-
stand the reactions of others. Their deficiencies . . . diminish their
personal culpability."9 6 Though the similarities are clear, it is not
my intention to suggest that the mental capabilities of an 18-year-
old young adult are equivalent o the mentally disabled, but instead
to attempt to draw attention to the willingness of the court system
to be amenable to changes in the criminal system due to reduced
personal culpability based on documented diminished capacities.
Although there may be a difference between the mentally disabled
and the youthful offender's capacity to mature and respond posi-
tively to rehabilitation, this potential for change does not negate the
similarities between the two at the critical moment of decision mak-
ing related to possible criminal activity.
The juvenile brain's sensitivity to social influences makes the fo-
cus on rehabilitation in these years the key to encouraging substan-
tive behavioral changes.97 The current criminal justice system dra-
matically shifts the focus from determent and rehabilitation to pun-
ishment and retribution at the age of eighteen, the exact age when,
as some studies show, there is a peak in sensitivity to peer influ-
ences; both negative and positive.98 It is clear that the current
93. Id. at 318-19. The Court in Atkins made it a point to note that being able to distin-
guish right from wrong was not a consideration in determining culpability because the men-
tally disabled can usually determine right from wrong, but they often have other difficulties,
such as faulty logical reasoning skills and impulse control, which direct the limitation. Id.
at 317-19.
94. Id. at 315.
95. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316) ("As in
Atkins, the objective indicia of national consensus here . . . provide sufficient evidence that
today society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as
'categorically less culpable than the average criminal[.]").
96. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
97. BONNIE ETAL., supra note 74, at 93-94.
98. Id. at 94.
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structure of the criminal justice system requires moving highly sus-
ceptible brains into an extremely negative, adult-driven environ-
ment, leaving young adults even less likely to have a positively mo-
tivated experience that encourages behavior modification. In fact,
studies focused on the effects of the transfer of juveniles to the crim-
inal system report that transferred juveniles not only have higher
rates of reoffending, but also committed more serious offenses than
their peers who remained in the juvenile system.99 This finding
does not indicate that rehabilitative efforts are not made with
young adults in the criminal system, but it is widely understood
within the criminal justice community that rehabilitation does not
take priority over a punitive corrections philosophy.1 00
1. Use of Rehabilitation within the Juvenile System
Rehabilitation was a key part of the prison system from the early
1900s until the mid-1970s.101 However, the focus shifted within the
United States following the crime-rate increase of the 1960s, and
the prison system became primarily concerned with punishment,
leading to a dramatic increase in incarceration rates.102 In the
years following this shift, there has been a battle of opposing ideas,
with one side moving toward a return to the rehabilitative model,
relying on studies that show cognitive-behavioral based systems
tend to have the greatest success in reducing recidivism. 103 The ju-
venile justice system has seized upon this understanding, using the
prevalent scientific knowledge of the underdeveloped mind to take
a different approach in adjudication of juveniles, focusing on reduc-
ing exposure to the criminal system by weeding out low-risk youth
through the use of risk/needs assessments.1 0 4 The premise behind
the assessment process is that high-risk youths need greater in-
volvement and intervention, while low-risk youths need minimal
intervention in an attempt to prevent further criminalization
through exposure to the criminal system.10 5
99. See Emily Ray, Waiver, Certification, and Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Lim-
iting Juvenile Transfers in Texas, 13 SCHOLAR 317, 344 (2010). This article relied on infor-
mation from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, where studies reported that
transferred juveniles were thirty-four percent more likely to be rearrested for violent or other
crimes. Id.
100. Benson, supra note 8, at 46.
101. See Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Pol-
icy, Practice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 109, 109 (2000).
102. Benson, supra note 8, at 46.
103. Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 101, at 110.
104. Dev. Servs. Grp, Inc., supra note 41, at 1.
105. Id. at 4.
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The same scientific evidence that demonstrates that juveniles are
still moldable and susceptible to outside influences also shows that
this development does not end at the age of eighteen, so the same
approach taken with juveniles-cognitive-based rehabilitation and
individualized consideration in punishment-could be extended to
young adult offenders. That said, why is the current system of re-
habilitation through incarceration, as is implemented in the adult
system, not sufficient for young adult offenders? The alternative
mirrors our current criminal system; because the brain is still
highly susceptible to outside influences, the bad influences through
involvement in the adult criminal system will potentially outweigh
the good that is done through the moderate rehabilitation efforts.
Ultimately, the susceptibility of the juvenile brain to peer influ-
ences that makes rehabilitation so effective may backfire when the
youth is placed in a negative environment, such as the adult prison
system.
2. Impact of Prison on a Youthful Mind
Studies related to the effect of prison on young adults over the
age of eighteen are scarce. Therefore, we must rely on studies of
the effects of criminal prosecution on juvenile offenders and make
a correlation with the outcome to young adults. These statistics,
comparing juveniles transferred to criminal courts with those who
remain in juvenile court, generally show that the recidivism rate of
this age range in the juvenile system is much lower than the same
age range in the adult system. Some studies show the success rate
is as high as eighty percent for youth who remain in the juvenile
system, while the recidivism rate of young adults in the criminal
system becomes dramatically higher the closer a person is to the
age of eighteen at the time he or she becomes involved in the sys-
tem.106
For example, a study conducted on a population in the Texas
prison system subdivided male age groups within the adult system,
rather than the standard lumping together of juveniles and adults
into two categories.107 This study noted several interesting obser-
vations, namely the significant proof that the youngest age group,
eighteen to twenty-four, had higher parole failure rates than older
106. See Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the US 2010: By Age Table 38, FED. BUREAU OF
INVEST., https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl38.xls
(last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
107. Kyung Yon Jhi & Hee-Jong Joo, Predictors of Recidivism Across Major Groups of
Parolees in Texas, 6 JUST. POL'Y J. 1, 10 (2009) (analyzing recidivism rates by age range).
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adult categories.108 This study also found a relationship between
history of revocations, prior incarceration, employment history,
commitment offense, education or training in prison, and offense
severity.109 Of these variables, education or training in prison was
a significant predictor of reduced recidivism only for the age group
composed of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds.110 Through these
findings, the authors inferred that educational programs in prison
are not typically beneficial, with the only exception being younger
inmates.' These results make sense when paired with the
knowledge we now have about he youthful mind's susceptibility to
outside influences. Through the use of this study, the argument can
be made that young adult offenders, like juvenile offenders, are af-
fected by the atmosphere of incarceration in similar ways, develop-
ing "distorted views of their identities" and "learning anti-social be-
haviors from the inmates around them,"112 having the opposite ef-
fect of that which is intended-deterrence.
Other studies show that juveniles in the adult prison system have
limited exposure to social norms and are limited in their ability to
develop a diverse behavioral toolkit from the wider social networks
of family, school or work, and community.113 "Instead, juveniles in-
carcerated with adults may learn social behavior that legitimizes
'domination, exploitation, and retaliation.' 1 14 Additionally, these
juveniles have an increased rate of suicide, being thirty-six percent
more likely to commit suicide in an adult prison versus a juvenile
facility,1 15 and are at a greater risk of post-traumatic stress disorder
and depression.1 16 As these findings indicate, there are far greater
concerns than just recidivism with young offenders placed in a cor-
rectional environment, specifically concerns related to long-term
mental and emotional health.
108. Id. at 15; the adult-age offender age categories and parole failure rates are as follows:
ages 18-24 at 58%; ages 25-34 at 49.1%; ages 35-44 at 56.5%; and ages 45+ at 43.7%. Id. at
11.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id. at 19.
111. Id. The researchers also inferred that education and training might be more effective
for younger individuals because they have a smaller criminal record, but this was not directly
tested. Id.
112. Ray, supra note 99, at 320.
113. Id. at 347.
114. Id. (citing Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to
Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 184
(2007)).
115. Id. at 343.
116. See Carly B. Dierkhising, Andrea Eastman & Misaki N. Natsuaki, Victims Behind
Bars: A Preliminary Study of Abuse During Juvenile Incarceration and Post-Release Social
and Emotional Functioning, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 181, 183 (2014).
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One of the greatest long-term benefits of the juvenile system is
the impact, or lack thereof, of a juvenile record compared to that of
a criminal record. A juvenile record is not readily available to the
public in most instances, and is not a legal mandatory disclosure for
job applications.1 17 Rehabilitation and reduced recidivism means
very little if the long-term impact of the criminal behavior can never
be mitigated. In a three-year study conducted by the Arizona State
University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice on the im-
pact of a prison record on employment, the conclusion was disheart-
ening, to say the least.11 8 The researchers concluded that a prison
record has a "dampening effect on job prospects," particularly in the
low-skill food service sector, where ex-prisoners are more likely to
seek employment after release.119 Unsurprisingly, most employers
in the study expressed a preference for hiring individuals with no
prior criminal history.120 Employers also associated employees who
had served prior prison time with "a number of negative work-re-
lated characteristics" including tardiness and the inability to get
along with co-workers, demonstrating that the stigma surrounding
a person with a criminal record is not easily diminished, regardless
of the specific details surrounding each offender's individual situa-
tion. 121
We could apply these findings to young adults who are placed in
criminal facilities based solely on the age of majority rule. The pub-
lic policy reasons for reducing the transfer of youthful offenders to
the criminal system, coupled with the need to guard the youth of
our society while they grow and mature for the purpose of molding
more productive members of society, should apply equally to the el-
ement of society caught between youth and adulthood, specifically
the eighteen- to twenty-one-year range, when the exposure is likely
to have an equal disparate impact.
C. The Opposing View
As public policy consistently straddles the line between retribu-
tion and rehabilitation, administrators and legislators take baby
117. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a) (2012) ("Unless otherwise authorized by this section, information
about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is related to
an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege.") (emphasis
added).
118. See generally Scott H. Decker et al., Criminal Stigma, Race, Gender, and Employ-
ment: An Expanded Assessment of the Consequences of Imprisonment for Employment, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 244756 (2010).
119. Id. at 1-2.




steps in correcting the system, responding to public outcry or reac-
tion to public events. To propose a giant step, such as raising the
age of majority for criminal prosecution, would likely result in back-
lash. This opposition derives from the idea that society still prefers
the "justice model," with a focus on punitive measures before reha-
bilitative approaches.122 It appears that much of society wants jus-
tice at any cost, making it difficult to persuasively push for an in-
crease in rehabilitative efforts as the key to societal change.
Though it is evident that the pendulum is slowly returning from the
pessimistic "nothing works" mentality about the justice system to
the use of rehabilitation and correctional intervention in an attempt
to reduce recidivism, there are certain steps we may still be unwill-
ing to take.123 Admittedly, some research shows a small percentage
of young offenders become "life-course" defendants regardless of the
nature of intervention, justifying, in some, the belief that an overly-
aggressive approach is the best approach.12 4
From an economic standpoint, a popular argument for the cur-
rent structure of the criminal system is connected to the higher cost
of keeping young adults in the juvenile system for a longer period
of time.125 The estimated cost of detaining a juvenile for one year is
four times higher than keeping an adult in prison for the same
amount of time.12 6 This cost analysis has led to double the number
of states with statutory transfer laws.127 Understandably, the ex-
cess cost is due to the primary purpose of the juvenile system: to
provide educational, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services, ulti-
mately requiring a greater number of staff to offer a safer, more
therapeutic environment.128 This cost discrepancy is the primary
consideration in the benefit-cost analysis, designed to "help policy-
makers understand which policies generate benefits to society that
are large enough to justify a program's costs."12 9 Courts frequently
use this benefit-cost analysis, alongside other non-economic factors,
in determining whether or not a juvenile should be transferred to
the adult system.130 Society may often find it difficult to justify
spending additional tax dollars on a program that may not benefit
122. Howell et al., supra note 24, at 1.
123. Cullen, supra note 28, at 299.
124. Loeber, supra note 43, at 1-2.
125. See Jens Ludwig, Roseanna Ander & Laura Brinkman, Conducting Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Other Juvenile Justice Policies 2 (Dec. 21, 2009)
(University of Chicago).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2-3.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
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society as a whole. The expense of incarceration and rehabilitation
is easier to quantify than the possible outcome of a positive correc-
tional environment on an individual, making it a more attractive
consideration when justifying criminal policies.
However, in a study conducted in Texas, where the age of major-
ity for criminal activity is seventeen, researchers analyzed the po-
tential cost of raising the age of majority by one year, and indicated
a financial benefit in the long run.131 In this study, researchers con-
sidered short- and long-term effects on the juveniles, victims, and
taxpayers, estimating an eventual net benefit of $88.9 million for
every cohort moved into the juvenile system.132 But, the research-
ers noted that this policy change would require an initial invest-
ment of $50.9 million per cohort,133 making it a bit less convincing
in the short-term. The researchers also noted that, though this
change would mean total additional costs to the Texas juvenile sys-
tem, estimated to be approximately $160 million for one year of ar-
rest and adjudication of all seventeen-year-olds in the system,134 it
would also mean an approximate savings of $104 million in the
adult system after removing all seventeen-year-old offenders to the
juvenile system.135 An additional long-term benefit would come
with the reduction of the recidivism rate, a potential savings of an
additional $4 million. 1 3 6 With incarceration being a predictor of fu-
ture behavior, a reduction in recidivism offers not only a financial
reward, but also a potential reduction in future victimization.
D. Proposal
Various options exist for reconciling these noted discrepancies,
most requiring extensive adjustments and some requiring a com-
plete overhaul of the criminal justice system. The two most realistic
and promising options are to: (1) raise the age of majority for crim-
inal offenses to, at a minimum, age twenty-one, and at a maximum,
age twenty-five; or (2) create a separate court for young adult of-
fenders, including special correctional facilities similar to current
youth facilities. If, as neurological studies seem to show, there is
131. Michele Dietch, Rebecca Breeden & Ross Weingarten, Seventeen, Going on Eighteen:
An Operational and Fiscal Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction in
Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2012).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 46. This estimate was based on the costs of arrest, court involvement, juvenile
probation, and Texas Juvenile Justice Department commitment. Id.
135. Id. at 48. The study also noted other significant benefits besides financial, such as a
reduction in the number of individuals entering the adult system. Id. at 50.
136. Id. at 51-52.
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no significant difference in the decision-making capabilities of a
seventeen-year-old and a twenty-one-year-old, then there should be
no policy differences in how they are viewed by, and handled within,
the criminal system. If the age of majority is changed, young adults
would be given the same opportunity for rehabilitation and behav-
ioral adjustments without the damage of a criminal record, as the
juvenile system presently provides. Compared to the creation of a
new court, this is the most practical solution because it would only
require the absorption of an additional age group into an existing
system.
The alternative, creating a separate court system, would require
a greater overhaul of the current system, establishing a new set of
rules, new court dockets, etc. Though likely to be expensive in the
beginning, this method leaves the opportunity to create rules and
guidelines designed to serve the needs of this specific age classifica-
tion, rather than applying identical standards as those applied to
younger juveniles. This new system would also have the possibility
of absorbing part of the current juvenile docket, likely juveniles who
currently qualify for transfer to criminal court, creating a court sys-
tem narrowly tailored to serve the specific needs of maturing young
adults. These ideas are obviously not revolutionary, or even new,
as other countries have taken similar approaches.
1. Actions Taken by Other Countries
The United Kingdom is currently working on addressing the is-
sue of young adult offenders and the impact of criminalization, es-
tablishing a commission to report on the effects of the criminal sys-
tem on young adults and promote changes within the system.137
Germany has taken it a step further. In Germany, all young adults
aged eighteen to twenty-one are transferred to the juvenile courts,
and the courts have the discretion to choose sentencing according
to juvenile or adult laws based on the apparent maturity level of
each offender.138 Generally, the more serious cases, with a potential
for a more severe outcome, are handled in the juvenile courts, while
minor offenses are transferred to the adult system.139
137. See U.K. Transition to Adulthood, T2AALLIANCE, http://www.t2a.org.uk/t2a-alliance/
(last visited May 12, 2017). The Transition to Adulthood Alliance is a London-based organi-
zation established in 2008 to "raise awareness of the distinct needs of young adults, aged 18-
24, in the criminal justice system." Id.
138. See T2A, YOUNG ADULTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
PRACTICES, KING'S COLL. LONDON INT. CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES 3 (2010).
139. Id.
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In 2001, Austria and Lithuania became more flexible with sen-
tencing young adults, also allowing the court discretion in sentenc-
ing based on the perceived personality and maturity of the of-
fender.1 40 Both of these methods have managed to straddle the line
between juvenile and adult offenders, but have not officially taken
the step to extend the juvenile age of majority completely. However,
in New South Wales, Australia, the legislature has recently taken
steps to create a specific community-based order for young adults,
with a focus on dealing with the specific rehabilitative needs of
those in the program.1 4 1 The order is targeting young adults with a
moderate to high potential for recidivism and would carry shorter
sentencing terms, recognizing that "shorter interventions are gen-
erally more useful for young people in terms of promoting their re-
habilitation."14 2 Being a new initiative, I was unable to find any
real data available showing the immediate success of this program.
2. Recent State Actions
In the United States, some states and private organizations have
taken steps to deal specifically with the needs of young adults
charged with certain offenses, typically substance abuse-related,
where diversion is proven more effective than prosecution. For ex-
ample, New Hampshire police have joined forces with the courts in
implementing a diversion program for drug and alcohol related-of-
fenses, focusing on young adults between the ages of sixteen and
twenty, attempting to prevent these young adults from the burden
of a criminal record.14 3 Michigan uses a "wraparound model," uti-
lizing personal assessments to design "packages of support" for in-
dividual offenders, and creating specific programs designed to as-
sist young adult offenders transitioning out of the court system.1 44
One groundbreaking community-based program in Oregon,1 45
whose mission is to address the reintegration of young adult offend-
ers from prison back into society, using education, drug treatment,
140. Id.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5. See also Valley Court Diversion Programs offers Alternative Programs for
Youth and Adults, VALLEY COURT DIVERSION PROGRAMS, http://www.vcdp.org (last visited
Jan. 2, 2016), for a list of available programs.
144. T2A, supra note 138, at 5; see also Michigan Youth Reentry Model, MICH. COUNCIL
ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY (Sept. 2011), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/Michi-
gan_.YouthRe-entryModel_420255_7.pdf.
145. The program is a partnership composed of the Multnomah Court Sheriff's Office, the
Department of Community Justice, and Volunteers of America Oregon. Community Partners
Reinvestment Project (CPR), The CPR Jail Program, VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA-OREGON,
http://www.voaor.org/pdf-files/cpr-jail-program-report (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
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and job skill development, demonstrated reduced recidivism rates;
reduction in severity of addiction; and improvement in education,
employment, and housing situation.14 6 These individual state ac-
tions show an understanding within the system that changes need
to be made for the criminal justice system to better serve the needs
of the community. The next step is analyzing these changes to de-
termine what is most effective and implementing them throughout
the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Public policy demands a criminal system that effectively balances
the needs of victims with the potential for offender rehabilitation.
This requires a willingness within society to make adjustments in
light of ever-changing scientific and psychological advancements.
The difficulty lies in determining where to draw the line. Based on
the results of current scientific and behavioral studies, there is ad-
equate reasoning for adjusting the age of majority beyond the strict
bright-line age of eighteen when it means a greater potential for
remolding criminal young adults into productive members of soci-
ety. Admittedly, this transformation would require significant
modifications in both the juvenile and adult criminal systems, the
greatest burden being a financial one. Though the rehabilitation
model is slowly making its way back into the criminal system, it is
not enough to influence significant change. Rehabilitation means
nothing if we also saddle the offender with the label of an ex-convict
or criminal. Rather, making the necessary adjustments to the di-
viding line between youth and young adult by raising the age of
majority would not only mitigate the possibility of turning young
adults into criminals, but it also provides a greater opportunity to
work with moldable young adults to change the poor-decision-mak-
ing processes, ultimately reducing recidivism and additional victim-
ization.
146. Id. at 5, 7. The CPR Jail Program's self evaluation of program participants after five
years has seen as much as a seventy-five percent reduction in reconviction for a felony of-
fense, and sixty-one percent were employed as of 2010. Id. at 5.
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